We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can communicate prior to play, but they cannot reach binding agreements: A coalition-proo[ equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no coalition has an improving and self-enforcing deviation. We show that any correlated strategy whose support is contained in the set of actions that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and weakly Pareto dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is contained in that set, is a coalition-proof equilibrium. Consequently, the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable game is coalition-proof. Joumal o[ Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
INTRODUCTION
When the players of a noncooperative game have the opportunity to communicate prior to play, they will try to reach an agreement to coordinate their actions in a mutually beneficial way. The aim of this paper is to characterize the set of agreements that the players may reach. Since we consider situations where agreements are nonbinding, only those agreements that are not subject to viable (i.e., self-enforcing) deviations are of * We are grateful to Mark Walker for many interesting discussions.
interest. As preplay communication aHows the players to correlate their play, we take the set of aH correlated strategies as the space of feasible agreements. We characterize the set of coalition-proof equilibria as the set of agreements from which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation making aH its members better off.
Admitting correlated strategies as feasible agreements alters the set of coalition-proof equilibria of a game in a fundamental way (viz., no inclusion relationship between the notion of coalition-proofness that we propose and others previously introduced is to be found). In fact, there are games where the only plausible agreements are correlated (and not mixed) agreements. We provide examples with this feature and we show that the notion of coalition-proof equilibrium that we propose identifies these agreements. Unfortunately, as with other notions of coalition proofness previously introduced, the existence of an equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. We are able to establish, however, that if there is a correlated strategy which (i) has a support contained in the set of actions that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and (ü) weakly Pareto dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is contained in that set, then this strategy is a coalition-proof equilibrium. Consequently, the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable game is coalition-proof.
Other authors have explored the implications of preplay communication when agreements are mixed strategy profiles. Aumann (1959) introduced the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, which requires that an agreement not be subject to an improving deviation by any coalition of players. This requirement is too strong, since agreements must be resistant to deviations which are not themselves resistant to further deviations. Recognizing this problem, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) (henceforth referred to as BPW) introduced the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), which requires only that an agreement be immune to improving deviations which are self-enforcing. A deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation available to a proper subcoalition of players. This notion of self-enforceability provides a useful means of distinguishing coalitional deviations that are viable from those that are not resistant to further deviations. Only viable deviations can upset potential agreements. A deficiency of CPNE, however, is that it does not aHow players to agree to correlate their play.
Although the possibility that players correlate their actions when given the opportunity to communicate was recognized as early as in Luce and Raiffa (1957) , only recently did Einy and Peleg (1995) (E & P) introduce a concept of coalition-proof communication equilibrium. The difference between E & P's notion and ours can be better understood if we assume that correlated agreements are carried out with the assistance of a media-toro The mediator selects an action profile according to the agreement and then makes a (private and nonbinding) recommendation of an action to each player.
E & P consider situations where the players may plan deviations only after receiving recommendations. In our framework, however, players plan deviations before receiving recommendations, and no further communication is possible after recommendations are issued. This difference manifests itself most clearly in two-person games where an agreement is coalition-proof in our sense only if it is Pareto-efficient within the set of correlated equilibria, while an agreement that is coalition-proof in E & P's sense need not be. We provide an example with this feature in Section 4. The second difference is that in our framework deviations may involve the members of a coalition jointly "misreporting" their types, while this possibility is not considered by E & P's notion. In Section 4 these differences are discussed in detail. Ray (1996) proposes a notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium in which the players' possibilities of correlating their play are limited by an exogenously given co"elation device, and he shows that there are coalition-proof equilibria which cannot be attained by means of direct devices (Le., devices in which players' messages are their action spaces). This finding raises the question whether aHowing nondirect devices might alter the coalition-proof correlated equilibria (CPCE) of a game when, as in our definition, players' possibilities of correlating their play are not exogenously given. We do not have a general answer to this question. For games which satisfy the sufficient conditions we provide for exi~tence of a unique CPCE, however, the set of equilibria we identify as coalition-proof is the same regardless of whether or not nondirect devices are available to the players.
As the foHowing example illustrates, correlated play naturaHy arises when communication is possible (and regardless of whether or not players have access to a correlation device). Therefore one should take the set of correlated strategies as the set of feasible agreements, and one must consider deviations that involve correlated play by members of a deviating coalition.
Three-Player Matching Pennies Game (TPMPG).
Three players each simultaneously choose heads or tails. If aH three faces match, then players 1 and 2 each win a penny while player 3 loses two pennies. Otherwise, player 3 wins two pennies while players 1 and 2 each lose a penny.
The matrix representation of this game is given in Table 1 . This game has two pure-strategy and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: one pure- 
strategy equilibrium consists of players 1 and 2 each choosing heads (tails) and player 3 choosing tails (heads). In the mixed strategy equilibrium each player chooses heads with probability t.
The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset by a deviation of the coalition of players 1 and 2; in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where players 1 and 2 both choose heads, they each obtain a payoff of -1. By jointIy deviating (both choosing tails instead) players 1 and 2 each obtain a payoff of 1. This deviation is self-enforcing as players 1 and 2 each obtain their highest possible payoffs and therefore neither player can improve by a further unilateral deviation. (A symmetric argument shows that the other pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is not a CPNE either.) In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, players 1 and 2 each obtain an expected payoff of -t. This equilibrium is not a CPNE as players 1 and 2 can jointly deviate (both choosing heads instead) and obtain a payoff of zero. This deviation is self-enforcing, since given that pI ayer 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probability, neither player can obtain more than zero by a further deviation. Since a CPNE must be a Nash equilibrium, this game has no CPNE.
Nevertheless, the game does have an agreement that is resistant to improving deviations. This agreement is the correlated strategy where with probability ~ players 1 and 2 both choose heads and with probability ~ both choose tails, and player 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probability. Under this agreement each player has an expected payoff of zero. No single player can deviate and improve upon this agreement: neither player 1 nor player 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating, as they both lose a penny whenever their faces do not match. Neither do es player 3 benefit from deviating: given the probability distribution over the moves of players 1 and 2, he is indifferent between heads and tails. Moreover, since the interests of players 1 and 2 are completely opposed to those of player 3, no coalition involving player 3 can improve upon the given agreement. Final1y, given player 3's strategy, players 1 and 2 obtain at most a payoff of zero, and therefore they cannot benefit by deviating. Hence, no coalition can gain by deviating from the agreement. Notice that the agreement described aboye is not a mixed strategy profile and so it cannot possibly be a CPNE. As we shall see, however, when we expand the space of agreements to inelude all the correlated strategies, this agreement is the unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the game. (See Moreno and Wooders, 1995 , for an experimental study of tbis game.)
The possibility of players correlating their play arises even when communication is limited. Consider, for instance, the game described in Table II which is related to a elass of games discussed in Farrell (1987) ; in this game two identical firms must simultaneously decide whether to enter a market which is a natural monopoly. This game has three Nash equilibria: (Enter, Not enter), (Not enter, Enter), and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each firm enters the market with probability ~. Each of these Nash equilibria is also a CPNE.
Although the mixed Nash equilibrium is a CPNE, it is not resistant to improving deviations given the possibility of preplay communication. The firms can improve by augmenting the game with a round of cheap talk. In the game with cheap talk each firm simultaneously and publiely announces whether it intends to "Enter" or "Not enter" the market. Following the announcements each firm makes its choice.
Suppose the firms agree to play the following Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibrium of the game with cheap talk. Each firm announces "Enter" with probability %. If the profile of announcements is either (Enter, Not enter) or (Not enter, Enter), then each firm plays its announcement. Otherwise, each firm plays "Enter" with probability ~. This equilibrium yields an expected payoff for each firm of --ft while in the mixed N ash equilibrium of the original game each firm has an expected payoff of only -~.
Preplay communication has enabled the firms to correlate their play. In this Nash equilibrium of the cheap talk game the firms effectively play the correlated strategy (of the original game) given in Table III . This joint probability distribution is not the product of its marginal distributions and therefore cannot be obtained from a mixed strategy profile of the game without communication. This "correlated deviation" from the mixed strategy equilibrium makes both firms better off. Moreover, it is a self-enforcing deviation since it is a correlated equilibrium of the original game. Expanding the set of fe asible agreements from the mixed strategies (as in CPNE) to the set of correlated strategies does not lead simply to an expansion of the set of coalition-proof agreements. In the Three-Player Matching Pennies game we found a coalition-proof agreement where no CPNE existed. In the entry game we found a CPNE that was not coalition-proof. Thus, there is no inclusion between the set of CPNE and the set of equilibria that are coalition-proof in our sense.
In our framework the primitives are a set of feasible agreements and the concepts of fe asible deviation and of self-enforcing deviation by a coalition from a given agreement. The set of feasible deviations by a coalition from a given agreement is the set of all correlated strategies that the coalition can induce when the complementary coalition behaves according to the given agreement and when the members of the coalition correlate their play. The definition of a self-enforcing deviation is recursive. For a coalition of a single player any fe asible deviation is self-enforcing. For coalitions of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if it is fe asible and if there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper subcoalitions. With these concepts, our notion of coalition-proofness is easily formulated; an agreement is coalition-proof if no coalition (not even the grand coalition) has a self-enforcing deviation that makes all its members better off.
Our notion of a self-enforcing deviation coincides with that implicit in the concept of CPNE. The difference between our notion of coalitionproofness and CPNE is only that we take the set of correlated strategies as the space of feasible agreements. For games of complete information, if feasible agreements are mixed strategies then our definition of coalitionproofness coincides with CPNE. (This is established in Appendix B.) In sorne situations it may be natural to restrict the space of feasible agreements (e.g., if communication is limited) or to limit the possibilities of players to form deviations. The framework we propose easily accommodates these kinds of changes.
In fact, our existence results are easily modified to provide conditions for the existence of a CPNE; namely, any mixed strategy profile whose support is contained in the set of action profiles that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and which weakly Paretodominates any other mixed strategy profile whose support is contained in this set is a CPNE. For games with strategic complementarities, Milgrom and Roberts (1994) have independently obtained analogous results.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we discuss our framework and define our notion of equilibrium for games of complete information. In Section 2 we establish conditions for existence of these equilibria and show by means of an example that an equilibrium does not always exist. In Section 3 we extend the concept of coalition-proofness to games of incomplete information. Of course, the notion of coalition-proof equilibrium for games of incomplete information reduces to that formulated for games of complete information when every player has a single type. We present separately the notion of coalition-proofness for games of complete information, as the notion's simplicity in this context facilitates the discussion and because we want to stress the fact that our notion of coalitionproofness can be formulated without resorting to games of incomplete information. In Section 4 we compare our notion of coalition-proof equilibrium and E & P's notion of coalition-proof communication equilibrium, and we present sorne concluding remarks.
GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION
A game in strategic form r is defined as where N is the set of players, and for each i E N, Ai is player i's set of actions (or pure strategies) and u i is player i's utility (payoff) function, a real-valued function on A = IIi E NAi' Assume that N and A are nonempty and finite. For any finite set Z, denote by ll.Z the set of probability distributions over Z. In particular, denote by ll.A the set of probability distributions over A, and refer to its members as co"elated strategies. A deviation by a coalition is a plan for its members to correlate their play in a way different from that prescribed by the agreement. We take a broad view of the ability of coalitions to plan deviations; for every different profile of recommendations received by its members, a deviating coalition may plan a different correlated strategy. Therefore, a deviation for a coalition S is a mapping from the set As of profiles of recommendations for its members to the set aA s of probability distributions over the set of the coalition's action profiles.
Given an agreement Ji, if a coalition S plans to deviate according to T/s:
As -aA s , and if the members of the complement of S play their part of the agreement, Le., they obey their recommendations, then the induced probability distribution over action profiles for the grand coalition is given for each a E A by
JL(a) = L, Ji(aS,a_S)T/s(aslas)· asEAs
It will be convenient to define the fe asible deviations for coalition S as those correlated strategies JL E A which the coalition can induce, rather than as mappings from As to aA s . Thus, a correlated strategy is a feasible deviation by coalition S from a given agreement if the members of S, using sorne plan to correlate their play, can induce the correlated strategy when each member of the complementary coalition obeys his recommendation. 
(a) = LasEAsJi(aS,a-s)T/ias las).
We illustrate our definition of a feasible deviation by describing a procedure that can be thought of as mimicking the process by which players select agreements and plan deviations. Given an agreement Ji, suppose that the mediator implementing Ji mails to each player a sealed envelope containing the player's recommendation. A coalition S deviates from Ji by employing a new mediator to which each member of S sends the (unopened) envelop it received from the mediator implementing Ji.
The new mediator opens the envelops, reads the recommendations as, and then selects a new profile of recommendations according to the correlated strategy 71sC as). The mediator then mails to each player i E S a sealed envelope containing his recommended action. When each player opens his envelope and obeys the recommendation it contains, the induced correlated strategy is given by the equation in Definition 1.1.
Given a coalition S E 2 N , S*-0, and an agreement IL E aA, let D( IL, S) denote the set of feasible deviations by coalition S from IL; note that IL E D( IL, S), since a coalition always has the trivial "deviation" consisting of each member of the coalition obeying his own recommendation. Also note that for every IL E aA, we have D( IL, N) = aA. A correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no individual has a fe asible improving deviation.
The definition of strong Nash equilibrium suggests the following definition of strong correlated equilibrium 1 : a strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no coalition has a deviation which makes every member of the coalition better off. DEFINITION 1.2. A correlated strategy IL E aA is a strong co"elated equilibrium if no coalition S E 2 N, S ' * 0, has a feasible deviation jL E
D( IL, S), such that for each i E S, we have U¡( jL) > U¡( IL).
The agreement described in the introduction for the Three-Player Matching Pennies game is, for example, the unique strong correlated equilibrium of that game. Like strong Nash equilibrium, the notion of strong correlated equilibrium is too strong. A strong correlated equilibrium must be resistant to any feasible deviation by any coalition. In particular, it must be resistant to deviations which are not themselves resistant to further deviations. Consider, for example, the Prisoners' Dilemma game described in Table IV . This game has a unique correlated equilibrium where (D, D) is played with probability one. This correlated equilibrium is not a strong correlated equilibrium since the correlated strategy jL consisting of playing (e, e) with probability one is a fe asible deviation which makes both players better off. Since a strong correlated equilibrium must be a corre- In order to be able to distinguish those deviations that are viable from those that are not (and which therefore should not upset an agreement as coalition-proof) we introduce the notion of self-enforcing deviation; a correlated strategy ¡.L is a self-enforcing deviation by coalition S from correlated strategy Ji if ¡.L is a fe asible deviation and if no proper subcoalition of S has a further self-enforcing and improving deviation. This notion of self-enforceability is identical to the one implicit in the concept of CPNE. 
Since a coalition consisting of a single player has no proper (nonempty) subcoalitions, any feasible deviation by a one-player coalition is self-enforcing. With this notion of a self-enforcing deviation, a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is defined to be a correlated strategy from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving deviation.
It is clear that a strong correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, which in tum is a correlated equilibrium. For two-player games the set of coalition-proof correlated equilibria is the set of correlated equilibria which are not strongly Pareto-dominated by other correlated equilibria (i.e., ¡.L is a CPCE if it is a correlated equilibrium, and there is no other correlated equilibrium Ji such that U¡( Ji) > U¡( JL) for each i E N). Thus, for two-player games, the set of coalition-proof correlated equilibria is nonempty. Although existence of a CPCE cannot be guaranteed in general games, in the next section we identify conditions under which a CPCE exists.
EXISTENCE OF CPCE AND CPNE
In this section we show that a CPCE (CPNE) exists whenever there is a correlated (mixed) strategy whose support is contained in the set of action proilles that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and which weakly Pareto-dominates every other correlated (mixed) strategy whose support is contained in this set. First, we define formally the notion of strict dominance. 
Again by the definition of fe asible deviation
Substituting l1j as defined aboye we have
Hence ¡i is an improving and self-enforcing deviation from jL by player j (recall that every fe asible deviation by a single player is self-enforcing ). Thus, jL is not a self-enforcing deviation by S from p.,; i.e., jL $ SED( p." S).
This contradiction establishes that
The following corollary establishes that if a correlated strategy p., whose support is contained in A'" weakly Pareto-domin ates every other correlated strategy jL whose support is contained in A"" (i.e., U¡( p.,) In Appendix B we show that the set of CPNE of a game can be characterized as the set of mixed strategies from which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation which makes all its members better off. The proposition aboye is easily modified to show that if (J' is a mixed strategy profile whose support is contained in A oo , then any self-enforcing mixed deviation from (J' by a coalition of more than one player also has its support contained in A oo • Thus, the corollary aboye establishes conditions under which a CPNE exists; whenever there is a mixed strategy profile whose support is contained in A oo and which weakly Pareto-dominates every other mixed strategy whose support is contained in A oo , then this strategy is a CPNE.
In fact, the existence of a correlated strategy ¡..t whose support is contained in A oo and which weakly Pareto-dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is also contained in A oo implies the existence of an action profile a E A oo which weakly Pareto-dominates every action profile in A oo (Le" such that for each i E N and each a' E A oo , u¡(a) ;::: u¡(a')). This action profile is therefore a (pure strategy) coalition-proof correlated (and Nash) equilibrium. Thus, the conditions that guarantee the existence of a CPCE alSO imply existence of a CPNE.
An obvious implication of our corollary is that the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable game (Le., a game for which the set A oo is a singleton) is the unique CPCE (and CPNE) of the game. Also if a correlated strategy ¡..t whose support is contained in A oo strongly Paretodominates every other strategy whose support is contained in A oo , then ¡..t is the unique CPCE of the game (as any other correlated equilibrium will be upset by the deviation of the grand coalition in which players ignore their recommendations and play according to ¡..
t).
It is worth noticing that the equilibria characterized by our corollary are strong in the sense that any improving deviation by a coalition of players is "upset" by a further deviation by a single playero Milgrom and Roberts (1994) refer to such equilibria as strongly coalition-proof. They provide conditions that guarantee the existence of these equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. Specifically, they show that if a game with strategic complementarities has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilibrium of the game (Theorem 1); if each player's payoff function is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximal (respectively, minima}) Nash equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilibrium (Theorem 2). Milgrom and Roberts establish their results using Tarski's fixed point theorem, and they do not rely on dominance arguments.
For games with finite strategy spaces, Milgrom and Roberts's results are implied by our corollary: if a game with strategic complementaries has a unique Nash equilibrium, then it is dominance solvable 2 ; hence, this equilibrium is the unique (strongly) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if each player's payoff function is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximal (respectively, minima}) N ash equilibrium weakly Pareto-dominates every other strategy whose support is contained in A oc , and therefore our Corollary implies that this equilibrium is a (strongly) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Of course, the equilibria identified by these conditions are also (strongIy) coalitionproof correlated equilibria.
A Game Where a CPCE Does Not Exist
Unfortunately, as the following example shows, there are games with more than two players with no coalition-proof correlated equilibria. Consider the three-player game given in Table V , taken from Einy and Peleg, where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix. is not a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium as players 1 and 3 have a self-enforcing and improving deviation. There was no loss of generality in assuming that player 1 has the lowest payoff. If player 2 has the lowest payoff, then there is a self-enforcing and improving deviation by players 2 and 1. If player 3 has the lowest payoff, then there is a self-enforcing and improving deviation by players 3 and 2. Since any correlated equilibrium has a self-enforcing deviation by two players which makes both players better off, this game has no coalitionproof correlated equilibrium. (This game do es not have a CPNE either.)
GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section we extend our notion of coalition proofness to games of incomplete information. A (finite) game of incomplete information (or Bayesian game) G is defined by where N is the set of players, and for each i E N, r; is the set of possible types for players i, A¡ is player i's action set, Pi: r; ~ llT _¡ is player i's prior probability distribution over the set of type profiles for the other players in the game (T _¡ = f1 j E N" (¡}~), and U¡: T X A ~ ~ is player i's utility (payoff) function (A = TI iE NA i , T = TI iE NT¡). We assume that the sets N, A, and Tare nonempty and finite. For every coalition of players S E 2 N , S "" 0, we denote by T s the set TI i E sT¡o A correlated strategy is a function ¡.L: T ~ AA. We let e denote the set of all correlated strategies. Given ¡.L E e, if each player reports his type truthfully and obeys his recommendation, then player i's expected payoff when he is of type ti E T¡ is
U¡(¡.Llt i )= E EPi(t_ilt;)¡.L(alt)ui(a,t). t_¡ET_ i aEA
Notice that in order for the players to play according to a correlated strategy, information about the players' types must be revealed so that an action profile can be selected according to the probability distribution specified by the given correlated strategy. We therefore must allow deviations by a coalition in which the players reveal a type profile different from their true one, as well as deviations where the players take actions different from those recommended. In the conceptual framework of mediation, the members of a coalition can deviate from a correlated strategy Ji by misreporting their type profile to the mediator or by disobeying the mediator's recommendations.
Intuitively, a deviation can be conceived of as follows: a coalition S carries out a deviation by employing a new mediator who represents the coalition with the mediator implementing ¡.L and with whom the members of S communicate. Each member of S reports his type to this mediator who then (1) selects according to sorne fs: T s ~ AT s a type profile for the coalition (which he reports to the mediator implementing ¡.L) and, upon receiving from the mediator implementing ¡.L the recommendations for the members of S, (2) selects according to sorne 'T/s: T s X T s X As ~ AAs an action profile (which he recommends to the coalition members). The action profile recommended by the new mediator depends upon the type profile reported to it, the type pro file it reported to the mediator implementing ¡.L, and the actions recommended by the mediator implementing ¡.L. This deviation generates a new correlated strategy which can be calculated from fs and ' T/s according to the formula given in Definition 3.l. 
¡.L(alt) = E E fS(T S Its)Ji(us,a-sl Ts,t_s)'T/s(asl Ts,t s ' us)·

TsET s asEAs
The set of fe asible deviations by coalition S from a correlated strategy is the set of correlated strategies that the coalition can induce by means of sorne fs and r¡s. Given JL E C and S E 2 N , S =1= 0, denote by D( JL, S) the set of all fe asible deviations by coalition S from correlated strategy JL. In our framework, the notion of Pareto dominance used determines whether a deviation is an improvement for a coalition. Consequently, alternative notions of Pareto dominance will lead to different notions of coalition-proof communication equilibrium. There are two alternative notions worth considering.
We say that jL weakly Pareto S-domina tes JL if no member of S is worse off under jL than under JL for any of his types (i.e., if (3.1) is satisfied), and if at least one member of S is better off under jL than under JL for one of his types O.e., if (3.2) is satisfied for sorne i E S rather than for aH i E S). The notion of weak Pareto dominance does not seem appropriate; an agreement wiH be ruled out if a coalition has a self-enforcing deviation which makes only a proper subset of its members better off, even though there are not clear incentives for such a coalition to formo
We say that jL strongly Pareto S-dominates JL if each member of S is better off under jL than under JL for each of his types O.e., if the inequalities (3.1) are satisfied with strict inequality). Strong Pareto dominance is sometimes too strong. For example, if the utility function of sorne player is constant for one of his types, then there is no deviation which is improving for this playero Usingstrong Pareto dominance rules out the possibility of this player participating in any deviation.
It is easy to see that a correlated strategy JL is a communication equilibrium if no single player i E N has a fe asible deviation which Pareto i-dominates JL.4 In the spirit of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, a strong communicatio n equilibrium can be defined as follows: A correlated strategy ¡.L is a strong communicatio n equilibrium if no coalition S has a fe asible deviation which Pareto S-dominates ¡.L. We only want to require, however, that an agreement not be Pareto-domin ated by self-enforceab ility deviations. The notion of self-enforceab ility we define is identical to that introduced in Section 1. DEFINITION 3.3. Let -¡i E e and S E 2N, S *-0. The set of self-enforcing deviations by coalition S from -¡i, SED( -¡i, S), is defined, recursively, as follows:
With this notion of self-enforceab ility, a coalition-proo f communicatio n equilibrium is defined to be any correlated strategy ¡.L from which no coalition S has a self-enforcing deviation which Pareto S-dominates ¡.L.
When the set of type profiles T is a singleton, the concepts of strong and coalition-proo f communicatio n equilibrium reduce to, respectively, strong and coalition-proo f correlated equilibrium. Note that a strong communication equilibrium is a coalition-proo f communicatio n equilibrium, which in tum is a communicatio n equilibrium.
In two-player Bayesian games, the set of coalition-proo f communicatio n equilibria consists of the communicatio n equilibria that are not Pareto N-dominated by any other communicatio n equilibrium (i.e., the set of interim efficient communicatio n equilibria).5 Hence, for two-player Bayesian games a CPCE always exists. As established by the example in Section 1, games with more than two players need not have a CPCE.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the relation of CPCE to Einy and Peleg's notion of coalition-proo f communicatio n equilibrium (which we denote by CPCE EP )' and we present sorne concluding remarks.
In CPCE deviations are evaluated prior to the players receiving recommendations; a deviation is improving if it makes each member of the o deviating coalition better off, conditional on his type, for at least one of his types and no worse off for any of his types. In contrast, in CPCE EP deviations are considered afier players receive recommendations; a deviation is improving if it makes each member of the deviating coalition better off, conditional onboth his type and his recommendation, for each combination of types and recommendations that occur with positive probability. Consequently, for two person games, while a CPCE must be interim efficient a CPCE EP need not be. This is illustrated by the game Chicken given in Table VI . Table VII describes a correlated equilibrium of Chicken which yields an expected payoff of 5 for each player. This correlated strategy is not a CPCE as the grand coalition has the self-enforcing deviation given in Table VIII , which yields an expected payoff of 5.25 for each playero (This deviation is self-enforcing since it is a correlated equilibrium and therefore is immune to further deviations by a single player.) Table VII is a CPCE EP ' In this game each player has only a single type; therefore, for a deviation to be improving in Einy and Peleg's sense, it must make each player better off, conditional on bis recommendation, for each of bis possible recommendations. Consider player 1 given the recommendation B. His expected payoff conditional on his recommendation is 7. Since 7 is player l's highest possible payoff, no coalition involving player 1 can improve upon this strategy.6
One interpretation of E & P's framework is that players have the opportunity to communicate only after each player has received his recommendation. Thus, when determining whether or not an agreement is a CPCE EP ' the agreement is elevated to the position of a status quo agreement. It is required to be resistant to deviations following recommendations, but it is not confronted with alternative agreements which are improving at the stage prior to each player receiving his recommendation. If players have the opportunity to discuss their play prior to receiving recommendations, however, they will exhaust the opportunities for improvements at tbis stage. For the game Chicken, if the players must decide whether to play the strategy in Table VII or that of Table VIII , they should choose the latter as this strategy gives a higher expected payoff to each player, and it is also resistant to further deviations.
The second fundamental way in wbich the notions of coalition proofness differ is that Einy and Peleg do not admit the possibility that members of a coalition jointly "misreport" their types. A CPCE EP must be a communication equilibrium, and so a CPCE EP is immune to deviations where a single player misreports his type and disobeys his recommendation. However, in Einy and Peleg's framework, at the stage where deviations are considered, the players are assumed to have already truthfully reported their types. Thus, deviations may not involve the members of a coalition jointly misreporting their types, or involve one member of a coalition misreporting his type and another member of the coalition disobeying his recommendation. An example of a CPCE EP wbich fails to be immune to this latter kind of deviation is illustrated in the game of incomplete information below. The game is the same as the Three-Player Matching Pennies game (see Table 1 ), except that player l's moves have now become his types. This game is given in Table IX below. Player 1 now has two possible types {H I , TI} and no actions, while players 2 and 3 both have a singleton 6 It can be shown that there is no improving deviation upon ¡¡ in E & P's sense even with the weaker requirement that a deviation makes each member of the deviating coalition better off for at least one recommendation and at least as well off for all recommendations. is also a CPCE EP ; in E & P's framework, a deviation by a coalition is a mapping from the set of type and action (recommendation) profiles for the coalition to probability distributions over the coalition's set of action profiles. The coalition {l, 2} has no improving deviation since, if player 1 is of type H I , then player 3 moves T 3 with probability one and players 1 and 2 have a payoff of -1 regardless of the action taken by player 2. By the same argument, the coalition cannot improve if player 1 is of type TI' No coalition involving player 3 has an improving deviation as the interests of players 1 and 2 are completely opposed to the interests of player 3. That no single player has an improving deviation follows from the fact that J1. is a communication equilibrium.
In contrast, J1. is not a CPCE of the game. Consider the deviation by the coalition {l,2}, where player 1 reports TI when his type is HI and he reports HI when his type is TI' and where player 2 moves Hz when recommended T z and moves T z when recommended Hz. This deviation results in the correlated strategy {L given by {L(H z , H31 H I ) = {L(T z , T 3 1 TI) = 1, which yields expected payoffs of U I ( J1.1 H I ) = U I ( J1.1 TI) = 1 and U z ( J1.) = 1. The deviation makes both players better off and is also self-enforcing (as both players attain their maximum possible payoff). Hence J1. is not a CPCE.
Note that even if players can communicate only following the receipt of recommendations, CPCE EP assumes a certain myopia on the part of player 1. Consider again the CPCE EP of the Three-Player Matching Pennies game, where J1.(H z , T 3 1 H I ) = 1 and J1.(T z , H31 TI) = 1. If player 1 is of type HI and if he anticipates the opportunity to communicate following player 2's receipt of his recommendati on, then player 1 should report type TI and, at the communicatio n stage, suggest to player 2 that he should move H 2 • Player 2 should follow player 1's suggestion given that his interests are coincident with player 1's.
This game has a unique CPCE (which is also a CPCE EP )' where player 3 moves H3 with probability ~ regardless of player 1's type, and player 2 moves H 2 when player 1's type is HI and moves T 2 when player 1's type is TI. This is essentially the same agreement predicted for the complete information version of the game. In fact, given that the interests of players 1 and 2 are coincident and opposed to those of player 3, this seems the only reasonable outcome.
For the game of Chicken and the incomplete information version of the Three-Player Matching Pennies game we have found correlated strategies which are CPCE EP and which are not CPCE. For the Coordinationj Defection game in Appendix A we find a correlated strategy which is a CPCE and which is not a CPCE Ep • Thus, there is no inc1usion relation between these two notions.
We conc1ude by emphasizing our findings. First, we show that when players can communicate they will reach correlated agreements. For example, in the Three-Player Matching Pennies game the only intuitive agreement is a correlated (and not mixed) agreement. Second, we offer a natural definition of coalition-proo f equilibrium when correlated agreements are possible, and we show that no inc1usion relationship between this new notion and CPNE is to be found. (Consequently , the notion of coalition proofness is sensitive to the possibility of correlated agreements.) And third, we obtain conditions under which a coalition-proo f equilibrium exists.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix we present three examples. The first example is a game that has no coalition-proo f correlated equilibrium. The second example is the Three-Player Matching Pennies game; we show that the correlated strategy described in the Introduction is the unique coalition-proo f correlated equilibrium (and the unique strong correlated equilibrium) of the game. The third example is a game with a CPCE which is not a CPCE EP •
A Game with No Coalition Proof Correlated Equilibrium
We show that the game described in Table V has no coalition-proo f correlated equilibrium. A correlated strategy for this game is a vector /L = (/L¡jk)¡,j,kE{I,2l' where /L¡jk ~ o denotes the probability that players 1, 2, and 3 are recommended, respectively, actions a¡, b j , and e k • If /L is a correlated equilibrium, then it satisfies the system of inequalities (l) given by
We show that for each correlated equilibrium there is a coalition of two players which has an improving and self-enforcing deviation. Therefore, since a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium must be a correlated equilibrium, the set of CPCE of this game is empty.
Let /i be an arbitrary correlated equilibrium and suppose that player 1 has the lowest payoff of the three players. We show that the coalition of players 1 and 3 has a self-enforcing and improving deviation. If player 1 has the lowest payoff in a correlated equilibrium, then player 3's payoff is no larger than 1f, which is the value of the solution to the linear programming problem
We also have UI(/i) ~ t since player 1 has the lowest payoff.
Consider the deviation jL induced by players 1 and 3 playing (a2' el) with probability one for each profile of recommendations. (Then ÍL211 = /Lll1 + /L211 + /Lll2 + /L212' ÍL221 = /Ll2l + /L221 + /L122 + /L222' and ÍL¡jk = O otherwise.) Given this deviation, players 1 and 3 obtain payoffs of, respectively, 2 and 3, regardless of player 2's action. Hence, U I ( ÍL) = 2 > U I ( /i) and U 3 ( jL) = 3 > U 3 ( /i) and so ÍL is an improving deviation for {l,3}.
We now show that jL is self-enforcing. Clearly pI ayer 3 does not have a further improving deviation as he obtains his highest possible payoff. Player 1 has an improving deviation if the expected payoff of deviating to al' which is 3jL211' is greater than U I ( jL) = 2 (his expected payoff when he follows a recommendation to play a 2 ). However, this payoff is not larger than t, which is the value of the solution to the linear programming problem max 3( JL111 + JL2l1 + JLl12 + JL212)
The value of the solution to this problem is the maximum payoff that player 1 can obtain by a further deviation to al from the correlated strategy ¡J., given that the original agreement JL was a correlated equilibrium in which player 1 had the lowest payoff. Hence, player 1 has no further improving deviation.
There was no loss of generality in assuming that player 1 has the lowest payoff. Given the symmetry of this game, we can construct the following self-enforcing and improving deviations in each case: If player 2 has the lowest payoff, then players 1 and 2 deviate to {al' b l }. If player 3 has the lowest payoff, then players 2 and 3 deviate to {b z , c z }. Therefore, this game has no coalition-proof correlated equilibrium.
Three-Player Matching Pennies
In the Introduction we demonstrated that the correlated strategy JL* given in Table X below is a strong correlated equilibrium of the ThreePlayer Matching Pennies game. We now establish that JL* is the unique coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of this game. (A strong correlated equilibrium is also a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium; therefore JL* is also the unique strong correlated equilibrium.) Let JL be any correlated strategy. We reduce notation by writing JLxyz for the probability JL(xI' Yz, z3) ' where (xl' Yz, Z3) E {H I , TI} X {Hz, T z } X {H 3 , T 3 }; e.g., we write JLTTH for JL (T I , T z , H 3 ) . If JL is a correlated equilibrium, then it must 
We now show that A = t. 
Adding (2) and (4) 
In the Coordination / Defection game there are three pIayers and each pIayer has four actions: L (left), C (center), R (right), and D (defect).
Players' payoffs are given for each (al' a z , a 3 ) 
otherwise.
Let JL be a correlated strategy for this game, and write JLa¡aZ a 3 for the probability of action profile (al' a z , a (1995) . Informally, E & p's notion of CPCE considers the deviation ¡l to be self-enforcing because each player has sorne recommendation such that a further deviation is not improving. For example, if after the deviation to ¡.J player 1 (respectively, player 2 or player 3) is recommended L (respectively, e or R), then his expected payoff, conditional on his recommendation, is 2, his highest possible payoff. Thus, no coalition of players has a further deviation which makes each member of the coalition better off for each of his possible recommendations.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we prove Proposition B.1 which characterizes the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria as the set of mixed strategies from which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation which makes aH its members better off.
For S E 2 N, S =1= 0, let Given an agreement (j E I, define the set of fe asible mixed deviations by coalition S from (j as those mixed strategies that are obtained when each player i, i E S, randomizes independently according to sorne iT¡, while each player j, j E N '\. S, foHows the agreement and randomizes according to Oj. In other words, u is a feasible deviation from (j by coalition S if u can be written as a mixed strategy profile «iT)iES ' (Oj) Let DM«(j, S) denote the set of feasible mixed deviations by coalition S from (j. It is clear that a mixed strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no single player has a feasible mixed deviation which makes him better off. A mixed strategy is a strong Nash equilibrium if no coalition has a fe asible and improving mixed deviation.
The definition of a self-enforcing mixed deviation is obtained by replacing in Definition 1.3 the set of deviations with the set of mixed deviations. Hence, a mixed strategy u is a self-enforcing mixed deviation by coalition S from u if u is a fe asible mixed deviation and if no proper subcoalition of S has a further self-enforcing and improving mixed deviation from u. Using the notions of feasible and of self-enforcing deviation by a coalition from a mixed strategy, we define the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium as follows. Definition B.4 below formalizes the concept of CPNE as defined by Bemheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) . For convenience, the notion of CPNE is cast in terms of mixed strategies (members of I) instead of strategy pro files (members of n?~ 1 I). We abuse notation sometimes by writing a mixed strategy u E I as (u s , u-s) (ii) Assume that CPNE has been defined for games with fewer than n players, and let r be a game such that INI = n.
(a) A mixed strategy u E I is self-enforcing if for every S E 2 N " N, S -=1= 0, Us is a CPNE of r fu_s.
(b) A mixed strategy u E I is a CPNE of r if it is self-enforcing, and if there is no other self-enforcing mixed strategy ü such that for every
For every game in strategic form r let CPNE'(f) and CPNE(f) represent the sets of mixed strategies satisfying, respectively, Definitions B.3 and B.4. Also, we denote by SE(f) the set of aH self-enforcing mixed strategies of r. For each u E I, and each S E 2 N , S -:f= 0, we write SED!'t(u, S) for the set of self-enforcing mixed deviations from u by coalition S in the game r and we denote by u¡f(u) the expected utility of player i given mixed strategy u in the game r. Proposition B.l can now be stated as foHows. 
sEDlIÜ-s(as, S).
Proo! We prove the lemma by induction on the number of players in S. Let (iD Assume Lemma B.l holds for ISI < k. We show that it holds for ISI = k.
Step 1. If Us E sEDlIÜ-s(as, S) then u = (u s , a_s) E SED!'t(a,
S).
Let u = (us, a_s) $. SED!'t(a, S). Then there are R E 2 s " S, R -:f= 0, and ü = (ÜR' us" R' a -s) E SED!'t«us, a -s), R) such that for each i E R we have u¡f(ü) > U/(u). Since IRI < k, the induction hypothesis yields ÜR E SEDlI (ü-s,us'R) (uR,R) . Noticing that r/(a-S,uS,R) == (r/~-s)/ us" R' it also yields (ÜR' us" R) E SEDlIÜ-s(u s , R) 
